Measuring the return from pharmaceutical innovation 2015
Transforming R&D returns in uncertain times

Deloitte Centre for Health Solutions
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Foreword

Welcome to the sixth annual Deloitte report exploring the pharmaceutical industry’s performance in generating a return from its significant annual investment in new product innovation.

This report estimates the return on investment that 12 of the leading life sciences companies might expect to achieve from their late stage pipelines, which comprise assets that should launch within the next one to four years, based on publicly available information.

For the first time since Deloitte started to assess R&D returns in 2010, we have introduced a new group of companies to the analysis: four, mid-to-large-cap companies in recognition of the increasing amount of value produced by such companies and their importance to the life sciences industry. Adding companies of this size and scale has allowed us to deepen our insights into the company and portfolio characteristics that lead to higher R&D returns.

As in previous years, we continue to report our key R&D returns metrics, however, we have shifted the emphasis of the report to focus on deepening our understanding of the factors that positively influence returns for companies and patients. We have explored five themes that impact fundamentally a company’s ability to generate returns in R&D successfully; portfolio focus and volatility, competition for external innovation, company size, cash investment trends and the impact of peak sales trends.

Since our last report, we have seen macroeconomic pressure continuing to reduce returns in the life sciences sector and specific questions being raised over the pricing of innovative medicines across the world, including those markets which have different price setting mechanisms such as the US. There has also been renewed debate over the ‘correct’ level of R&D spending for companies and the industry as a whole, as well as the level of returns the industry should expect. These external factors, combined with internal productivity challenges, have generated the lowest projected returns since our report started in 2010. However, the extension cohort might provide some lessons on how to produce drugs that create value with less cost and infrastructure.

We hope you find the report insightful and welcome your feedback on the findings as well as the implications for the life sciences industry.

Colin Terry
Director, EMEA Life Sciences R&D Advisory
Deloitte LLP
colterry@deloitte.co.uk

Neil Lesser
Principal, Life Sciences Strategy, US
Deloitte Consulting LLP
nlesser@deloitte.com
Drivers of R&D performance

Number of assets progressed and launched since 2010

306 assets progressed with projected lifetime revenues of $1,414bn

Late stage pipeline 2010-15

186 products launched with projected lifetime revenues of $1,258bn

Therapy area consistency delivers more, higher value assets

External innovation is important – higher proportion of late stage pipeline value from external assets in extension cohort:

79% Extension cohort*

54% Original cohort

Bigger is not necessarily better

– between 2013-15 smaller companies are delivering higher R&D returns

17% Extension cohort*

5% Original cohort

* Extension cohort: mid- to large-cap companies
Core trends in 2015

R&D returns for original cohort decline

As cost to develop an asset increases, sales continue to decline

Despite declining returns original cohort has improved on two key metrics

Projected value lost through terminated assets has declined from ~$80bn each year to ~$30bn in 2015

However, between 2013-15, extension cohort of mid- to large-cap companies outperforms on all R&D metrics

130% higher average peak sales

25% lower average cost to develop an asset

17% vs 5% over three-times higher IRR
Executive summary

Since 2010, our original cohort of 12 companies has launched 186 products with estimated total revenues of $1,258 billion. Over the same period, the R&D divisions of these companies have progressed 306 assets into late stage pipelines, with total forecast lifetime revenues of $1,414 billion.

Despite these successes, overall cohort projected returns continue to decline, to 4.2 per cent this year from a baseline of 10.1 per cent in 2010. There are, however, some promising signs across the cohort this year; assets are retaining or increasing marginally their forecast revenues as they progress through late stage development, the negative impact of terminations has been reduced significantly, and 2014 was also a headline year for approvals, with 43 products approved.

There remains a stark imbalance between declining forecast peak sales and growing asset development costs. Since 2010, forecast peak sales per asset have declined by almost 50 per cent and the average cost of developing an asset has climbed by a third. The numbers simply do not add up for life sciences R&D to generate an appropriate return.

This year we also consider the performance of an extension cohort comprising four, mid- to large-cap companies so that additional insights can be drawn. The extension cohort outperforms the original 12 companies consistently on every measure. We believe this shows the economic viability of a different R&D business model which our original cohort could learn from. For the period 2013-15 using three-year average data, the extension cohort’s:

- projected return is three-fold higher
- cost to develop an asset is 25 per cent lower
- average forecast peak sales per asset is 130 per cent higher.

The dynamics behind R&D returns are complex and wide variations are exhibited at the individual company level. In 2015, we have identified the following attributes of high performing companies:

**Specialised therapeutics offer opportunity across all therapeutic areas (TAs)**
Across the 16 companies included in this report there is an increasing focus on specialised therapeutics. The industry’s R&D focus has been shifting towards speciality therapy areas given the higher levels of patient unmet medical need and identification of discrete patient populations. However, we also observe an increased degree of specialisation within traditional primary care therapy areas, as companies are looking to new types of therapies, mechanisms of action and patient segments as untapped opportunities to deliver value. Therefore, companies need to ensure that any shift to specialty TAs is not at the expense of potentially valuable opportunities in primary care TAs.

**A consistent therapy area focus tends to deliver higher value assets**
Our analysis indicates that companies who maintain a consistent therapy area footprint are projected to deliver higher R&D returns. We believe this is due to the deep knowledge and expertise that a company accumulates when it focuses on specific diseases or mechanisms of action over a period of time. Companies that constantly change therapy area strategies and see large year on year shifts in the profile of their pipeline, may require higher investments to achieve similar returns.
Bigger is not necessarily better – smaller companies are delivering higher R&D returns

In line with last year’s findings, company size matters – bigger companies struggle to create value as effectively as their smaller counterparts. This finding has been reinforced by adding the extension cohort into the analysis. We believe there are fundamental company characteristics causing this difference in performance for example, the culture of R&D, greater agility of decision-making and governance, less operational complexity and the ability to make swifter data-driven decisions.

Declining peak sales are the major contributor to the cohort’s reduced productivity

Since 2010, the decline in forecast peak sales of assets has had the greatest, negative impact on R&D returns. This reduction has been caused by multiple, distinct pressures from reimbursement, competition and smaller patient volumes. Without appropriate levels of R&D returns in more targeted indications, the industry cannot sustain future pipeline investment.

This year’s report highlights the importance of implementing the right R&D operating model. Aligning R&D capabilities around a few, stable therapy areas within a company will add value to scientific, regulatory and commercial value propositions. Agility and flexibility, in combination with a focus on science, will allow external sources of innovation to be optimised. Finally, reducing development complexity, through streamlining functions and addressing unproductive infrastructure should materially improve returns.

Since 2010, our original cohort of 12 companies has launched 186 products with estimated total revenues of $1,258 billion.

External innovation is just as important for smaller companies

The original cohort’s late stage pipeline value still relies heavily on external sources of innovation. The extension cohort – despite the wide perception that its success is grounded solely in internal innovation – generates even more of its late stage pipeline value from external sources.

Companies are now more likely to return cash to shareholders than they are to invest in R&D, product licensing and company acquisitions

While R&D spend as a proportion of cash generated has grown since 2002-04, our analysis of cash use across the original cohort shows that companies are retaining less of the cash generated within the business. Instead the companies are increasingly choosing to return this to shareholders via dividends and share buybacks. This seems to reflect a decrease in confidence that R&D, acquisitions and license investments are able to earn the returns needed.

External innovation is just as important for smaller companies
Part 1: The healthcare landscape is evolving

Macroeconomic trends continue to exert downward pressure on life sciences research and development (R&D). The commercial environment into which drugs are launching remains challenging; budget holders are striving to deliver better outcomes with limited budgets; patients are more aware of available treatment options and are demanding choice; and new product launches have to deliver significant improvements over existing therapies to be considered for reimbursement, let alone premium pricing. The few remaining developed markets that continue to allow pharmaceuticals to be priced freely, such as the US, are coming under increased scrutiny from payers, providers and patients to justify the increasing cost and deliver efficiencies for their healthcare systems. This will only serve to put increased pressure on the future returns life sciences companies are able to deliver.

Patient centricity and a willingness to share risk are changing the dynamics of pharmaceutical R&D

While our report will show that there are many productivity and business model challenges the industry needs to overcome, there is clear evidence that progress is being made in promoting pharmaceutical innovation:

• currently, more than 7,000 drugs and treatments are in development globally

• 158 new molecular entities (NMEs) were approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) between 2010-14 compared with 110 between 2005-09

• the number of orphan drugs (ODs), drugs that treat very rare diseases that are often life-limiting, approved in both the US and Europe has increased significantly over the last five years

This progress has been made by key players in the healthcare ecosystem, including the pharmaceutical industry, regulators, healthcare providers and patient groups, focussing their attention on:

• accelerating regulatory pathways for areas of high patient unmet need. Since the introduction of the FDA’s breakthrough designation in 2012, the regulatory pathway has accelerated the approval of numerous drugs for serious or life-threatening conditions. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) is piloting its Adaptive Pathway process to speed up patient access to promising new medicines. Other programmes have been implemented by a number of regulators across the globe, many focussed on speeding up access to ODs, where no current treatment exists. The Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa during 2014-15 demonstrated how industry and regulators can collaborate effectively to address an urgent public health need.

• creating partnerships across multiple stakeholders focused on solving difficult scientific and business model challenges. In contrast to traditional two-party transactions that dominated the business development climate in years past, today’s partnering landscape has increased the amount, diversity and objectives of partnership models to promote open innovation and deliver value in biomedical research.

• shifting from delivering product to providing holistic healthcare solutions which address patient needs in a comprehensive way. These solutions, including adherence platforms, diagnostics and novel delivery mechanisms, provide better patient targeting, personalisation and engagement, as opposed to providing a pill or isolated medical intervention to a general population.
Measuring returns for pharmaceutical R&D is complex

Since 2010, Deloitte has been assessing the forecast R&D performance of 12 leading global life science companies by R&D spend. To predict the likely returns from a company’s pipeline two inputs are calculated: the cost of developing an asset or group of assets and an estimate of the future cash flows these assets could deliver. Many assets fail during development so to provide a comprehensive measure of R&D returns, it is critical to recognise the cost of failure – which Deloitte’s methodology does. Our methodology is unique in that the analytics are grounded in data that is either publically-available from audited, pharmaceutical company annual reports or is readily accessible from third-party data providers. This provides for a consistent approach which allows objective benchmarking across the cohort of companies. Also, for assets in development for multiple indications, revenues are considered at indication level, meaning returns take into account the movement of revenues for each indication as it enters, progresses or leaves the late stage pipeline.

Figure 1 summarises the methodology we have developed which calculates the internal rate of return (IRR) likely to be delivered by each company’s late stage pipeline. A detailed explanation is provided in Appendix 2 of this report. The methodology focuses on assets in late stage development as it is possible to generate reasonably robust forecasts for these assets.

Assets in late stage development are well characterised and easier to assess in terms of forecast sales potential, than early stage assets which tend to be less mature.

The methodology assesses the impact of a number of drivers on IRR and delivers two key metrics:

• yearly or static IRR – estimating the forecast rate of return at a given point in time
• longer-term or dynamic returns – estimating the impact of different drivers of change in IRR and providing a long-term view of R&D performance.

This report focuses on a longer-term view of R&D returns as this reduces the volatility of static measures which can be skewed by one or two assets with particularly high or low revenue expectations. As assets take approximately 15 years to progress from discovery to launch, and revenue forecasts can change substantially as they progress through late stage development, a longer-term view provides a more robust analysis of an organisation’s likely R&D returns.

This year the group of companies analysed has been extended to include four, mid- to large-cap companies so that greater insight can be derived from the R&D returns analyses, particularly around identifying company characteristics that lead to high performance.
Part 2: Costs continue to be a drag on R&D returns

In each of the figures presented in this report ‘cohort’ figures comprise the original 12 large pharmaceutical companies only, data for the additional four companies is presented separately and labelled ‘extension cohort’.

Since 2010, the cohort of 12 companies has progressed 306 assets with total, forecast lifetime sales of $1,414 billion into their late stage pipelines, and launched 186 products with total, forecast lifetime sales of $1,258 billion (see Figure 2). Regardless of these achievements, the cohort internal rate of return (IRR) declined from 10.1 per cent in 2010 to 4.2 per cent in 2015.

R&D business model in large pharmaceutical companies continues to be challenged

Across the cohort, companies continue to struggle to deliver new assets with sufficient value to offset losses through failure or increasing costs. Across the six-year period, the sum of value transferred into the commercial portfolio through product approvals has been balanced effectively by an uplift in IRR due to new assets entering the late stage pipeline. However, this uplift has been insufficient to compensate for the downward pressures on IRR due to asset failures and expected revenues declining as assets progress through late stage development. The negative impact of phasing and rising R&D cost outweighs the marginal improvements in operating margin or other factors such as licensing and tax rates realised by the cohort.

Note: ‘Other’ comprises licensing costs and tax rates.
Source: Deloitte LLP
An assessment of year-on-year trends since 2010 shows that the drivers of IRR have exerted different effects over time (see Figure 3). Although IRR continues to decline, there are promising signs at the cohort level when considering the drivers of IRR over the most recent time period:

- 2014-15 was a significant year for approvals; 43 products were approved, the highest number recorded since the study started in 2010
- the negative impact of terminations remained relatively constant between 2010-14, however, between 2014-15 their impact has declined
- between 2014-15 improvements have been made in maintaining and, to a small extent, increasing forecast asset revenues as they progress through the latter stages of development.

Despite these near-term statistics, the long-term picture of returns has not improved over time. Since 2011, the total number of assets in the cohort’s late stage pipelines has remained relatively constant at approximately 190, or an average of approximately 16 assets per company. However, the total forecast value of these assets has fallen in most years over the same timeframe. Despite the number and total value of the cohort’s total late stage pipeline being comparable for 2013 and 2015, R&D costs and increasing cycle times have impacted overall IRR negatively.

One additional observation is that R&D cycle times have impacted IRR negatively since 2010. Our analysis indicates that cycle times have increased by 16 months over the last six years.
There is wide variation in R&D performance across the cohort

To remove the volatility associated with yearly returns figures, the remainder of the analyses in this section focuses on weighted three-year average values. In our opinion, this provides a more robust assessment of an organisation’s long-term R&D performance and allows for more valid comparisons between companies to be drawn. Yearly static figures are presented in Appendix 1.

Across all of the R&D returns values assessed, there remains wide variation in individual company performance. We also see that the extension cohort outperforms the original cohort consistently across all measures.

For the original cohort, the three-year rolling average returns have declined across all time periods (see Figure 4). For the period between 2013-15, the extension cohort is forecast to deliver a three-fold level of R&D returns compared to the original cohort. Only two companies (Company A and F) have increased or maintained the level of returns forecast since 2010-2012. However, two other companies (Company E and G) have maintained or improved their levels of forecast returns since 2012-14.

Figure 4. Three-year average return on late stage portfolio, 2010-15

![Figure 4](source)
The cost of bringing a product to market continues to erode forecast returns

Across the cohort, the yearly cost to bring an asset to market has increased by a third since 2010, to $1.576 billion. This includes the costs of failed assets. We believe this increase is due to the cost of staffing and resourcing programmes with low probabilities of success, the escalating costs of study execution in complex disease areas, and ongoing overhead and infrastructure costs.

Considering the longer-term three-year rolling average view, only one company (Company A) has reduced its cost per asset and two companies have shown only marginal increases (Company C and G) over the same time period (see Figure 5). The extension cohort exhibits a leaner cost to develop an asset, at a quarter or $360 million less than the cohort average for the period 2013-15.

Figure 5. Three-year rolling average R&D cost to develop an asset from discovery to launch, 2010-15

Source: Deloitte LLP
The yearly static figure for average peak sales has declined by almost 50 per cent since 2010, to $416 million, further emphasising the imbalance between expected returns and R&D costs. The numbers simply do not add up for R&D to generate an appropriate return with the current high cost burden.

Across the cohort, while development costs continue to increase, three-year rolling average forecast peak sales continue to decline (see Figure 6). Indeed, all 12 companies exhibit reduced average peak sales compared with the first time period assessed, 2010-2012.

As with the other R&D returns metrics, the extension cohort is outperforming all of the other companies in terms of average peak sales of its late stage pipeline assets. For the period between 2013-15, on average, each asset is predicted to be a blockbuster, delivering peak sales of over $1 billion. This is more than double (130 per cent) forecast average peak sales for the original cohort of companies, indicating the higher overall commercial potential and quality of the extension cohort’s late stage pipeline assets. Deloitte recognises that one of the assets in this cohort is a life-changing medicine which addresses significant patient unmet need. It is therefore forecast to generate sizeable revenues and have a significant, positive impact on R&D returns in 2015. However, even if we remove this asset from our analyses, the average peak sales forecast for the extension cohort is still significantly higher (57 per cent) than the original cohort.

Figure 6. Three-year rolling average peak sales per late stage pipeline asset, 2010-15

Source: Deloitte LLP
Part 3: Balancing the R&D equation to increase returns

In last year’s report, we started to explore hypotheses for R&D outperformance. Building on those analyses, this part of the report presents a deeper and wider analysis of company and portfolio characteristics which influence the performance of R&D returns. We explore external factors which are changing the dynamics of R&D and also focus on three hypotheses of higher R&D performance:

- therapy area and portfolio focus
- externalisation
- company size.

**Speciality therapeutics offer opportunities across all therapy areas**

Company pipelines have evolved over time in response to a number of factors such as changes in the level of unmet medical need in patient populations, the technical probability of an asset’s success, or reimbursement and commercial market pressures. Our analyses suggest that R&D success is not necessarily a question of being in or out of a specific therapy area (TA), but rather how R&D activities are focused relative to market needs in a specific TA.

**Drugs for speciality therapy areas dominate late stage pipelines**

The healthcare landscape has traditionally been segmented into primary and secondary care diseases. Primary care were typified by diseases which affected large patient populations and were treated by family or general practitioners, secondary care were characterised by more complex diseases, which affected smaller patient populations and required treatment by a specialist.

Since the 1980s, the industry’s R&D efforts have delivered a myriad of products to manage primary care disorders across large patient populations, and to a lesser extent secondary care disorders such as certain cancers in more defined and smaller patient groups. However, the dynamics of both markets are converging. Patient populations within both settings are now being segmented into groups with specific profiles and discrete unmet medical needs. These needs require the development of speciality therapeutics that target a specific, and often complex, biochemical pathway or have a specialist mode of action – such as monoclonal antibodies and disease-modifying agents. Speciality therapeutics are delivering growth for pharmaceutical companies in both types of disease, although the commercial potential offered within each market sector differs.

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**Figure 7. Risk-adjusted pipeline value by therapeutic area, 2010-15**

Note: Percentages reflect relative change in 2010 to 2015 pipeline composition
Source: Deloitte LLP
We believe that the rise of these specialised therapies is increasing returns across TAs, including those in the primary care setting which is typified by higher patient volumes and lower pricing. Specialised therapies moving into larger markets will likely come under scrutiny from governments and payers since the impact on their budgets could be significant.

Our analysis shows that the majority of late stage pipeline value is focused in speciality TAs (see Figure 7).

The analysis this year also includes the ratio of forecast peak sales for new molecular entities (NMEs) versus non-NMEs, defined as the ‘innovation ratio’. Our analysis identified that opportunities exist within both evolving, speciality care TAs as well as mature, traditional primary care TAs (see Figure 8).

However, R&D activities need to be aligned with the needs of the respective TA as the opportunities differ due to the level of unmet patient medical needs present in each market:

• in mature markets existing treatments are typically effective for a significant part of the population. To achieve reimbursement and favourable pricing, new products must demonstrate considerable improvements in patient outcomes over existing ‘gold standard’ therapies, or target small patient segments which exhibit particularly high levels of unmet need. Non-NME assets are unlikely to present a compelling case for reimbursement or improved pricing to payers and governments, while NMEs still have significant commercial opportunity because of the innovation they represent

• in speciality TAs pockets of high patient unmet clinical need remain for which no current therapy is effective. Non-NMEs and line extensions continue to add value in new ways, to distinct patient populations or specific indications. While innovative products continue to be rewarded, they are often associated with smaller potential revenues as the populations they serve are small.

Opportunities exist in both primary care and specialty care sectors of the market and companies need to ensure that any shift to specialty TAs is not at the expense of potentially valuable opportunities in primary care TAs.
**A consistent therapy area focus tends to deliver higher value assets**

Our analyses show that companies maintaining a consistent TA footprint are delivering a larger number of higher value assets (see Figure 9). This suggests that consistency and focus are critical attributes for a sustainable and profitable pipeline flow. Those companies that exhibit volatile TA strategies are likely putting their longer-term R&D returns at risk.

‘Following the science’ – focussing on a detailed understanding of a disease state or mechanism of action within a TA – could offer higher rewards than ‘chasing the market’ – following diseases or TAs for which drugs with significant sales already exist or there is perceived to be a significant opportunity for sales.

Following the science requires sourcing external innovation that is earlier in the R&D pipeline and focuses on bringing scientific innovation capabilities into the organisation well before assets launch. This requires focus and patience, and lends itself to smaller scale, technology-specific acquisitions and collaborations.

Chasing the market strategies involve activities such as large scale mergers, acquisitions or licensing deals. These target assets or portfolios are typically in later stages of pipeline development and focus on delivering near-term revenues.

We believe companies that can demonstrate a specific, deep expertise in a TA and negotiate effectively with regulators and payers are likely to optimise returns. Our analysis suggests that higher returns are associated with those companies that follow the science; their TA consistency and focus appears to provide more long-term value compared to companies with more volatile late stage pipelines.

**Figure 9. Average year-on-year change in number and value of assets by TA, 2010 to 2015**

![Figure 9](image-url)

Note: The TA volatility index measures a company’s year-over-year change in the therapeutic composition of the late stage portfolio (Cohort = 100).

Source: Deloitte LLP
External innovation is just as important for smaller companies

Assets acquired externally through acquisitions or in-licensing, continue to account for the majority of forecast late stage pipeline revenues for the cohort. However, this proportion has been reducing over time and in 2015, declined to 54 per cent for the original cohort (see Figure 10).

The extension cohort is generally associated with a much higher externalisation ratio than the original cohort. Since 2013, approximately 80 per cent of its forecast late stage pipeline revenue has been delivered from assets sourced externally, a finding which contrasts with the standard belief that these companies are internal innovation machines.

The cohort view masks wide variation across the companies within the original cohort (see Figure 11). There are now seven companies with pipelines predominately driven by externally sourced innovation (compared to nine last year), and there are four companies with externalisation percentages below 35 per cent (compared to none last year).

Within the extension cohort, three of the four companies have pipeline valuations that are over 80 per cent derived from external sources.

The extension cohort is made up of mid- to large-cap companies which have experienced recent rapid growth. The time and investment required to establish drug development capabilities in new TAs is daunting, and the rapid growth of these companies is largely fuelled by external innovation and inorganic growth through acquisitions.

Historically, these companies have focused on one or two core TAs, but their smaller size has actually served as an advantage in terms of external innovation. Many of these companies have developed flexible and proactive approaches to external innovation, tapping into external sources of innovation being a critical element of their growth strategies.

Figure 10. Internal and external composition of forecast, late stage pipeline revenue, 2013-15

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
<th>Co-development</th>
<th>Licensed-in</th>
<th>Self originated NME/NBE</th>
<th>Self originated LE</th>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
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Note: Due to rounding totals may not equal 100 per cent
Source: Deloitte LLP
The success in terms of forecast returns of the extension cohort combined with their TA focus suggests they may be better at integrating the most innovative science due to their smaller and more nimble R&D organisations. Smaller R&D companies do not have to juggle the competing priorities of a large number of internally and externally sourced assets, which has likely led to the development of suboptimal R&D operating models in their larger competitors. The size and focus of an organisation that relies heavily on external innovation is likely to be different from one that generates innovation internally. Large pharmaceutical R&D organisations that continue to acquire external innovation will need to assess their operating models to ensure they can effectively integrate external innovation into their large, complex organisations.

Despite a marginal decline in external sources of innovation year over year, they remain a substantial element for sustaining the cohort’s late stage pipelines. Asset sourcing strategies are likely to play a more important role in generating returns as competition for external assets intensifies, driving up prices and, potentially, further eroding R&D returns.
Bigger is not necessarily better – smaller companies are delivering higher R&D returns

Last year our analysis identified two significant trends: larger companies are delivering lower R&D returns and spending more to develop an asset than their smaller peers. To explore these trends further, this year we have expanded our cohort of leading R&D companies to include an extension cohort of four, mid- to large-cap companies. In Part 2 of this report we presented the three-year average R&D performance metrics for both the original and extension cohorts. The extension cohort outperforms the original 12 companies consistently:

• IRR for the period 2013-15 is three-fold higher – 17 per cent versus 5 per cent
• cost to develop an asset is 25 per cent lower – $1,082 million versus $1,442 million
• average forecast peak sales per asset is 130 per cent higher – $1,037 million versus $451 million.

Additionally, when the extension cohort companies are plotted alongside the original cohort, there is significant correlation for both company size and IRR, and cost per asset and IRR (see Figures 12 and 13).

Figure 12. Company size versus weighted average three-year IRR

![Graph showing the relationship between company size and IRR](image-url)

- Original cohort companies
- Extension cohort companies

Figure 13. Ten-year R&D spend versus three-year average cost to develop an asset

![Graph showing the relationship between R&D spend and cost](image-url)

- Original cohort companies
- Extension cohort companies

Source: Deloitte LLP
The biggest contributors to burgeoning R&D costs include:

• portfolio inefficiencies – there are too many assets or development programmes of little value and high risk, which may be the result of incentives skewed toward simple, volume based targets (for example phase II transitions) rather than value or return-based goals

• infrastructure overheads – larger R&D organisations have legacy infrastructure that cannot be improved easily, such as IT systems, plants and facilities as well as excess overhead, and replicated governance/decision-making bodies

• complexity – R&D organisations exist in a data-rich environment of overwhelming complexity. Studies and procedures are complex and require data capture at multiple points along an asset’s lifecycle. In addition, regulators are seeking increasing amounts of data along with robust data management processes. While some complexity is inevitable, there are indications that replicated data and associated processes are not being managed optimally, and automation levels appear low.

To compete effectively and generate sustainable returns, companies need to optimise the fixed and variable costs of their R&D organisations to reduce overheads and complexity in clinical development. Companies in the extension cohort, by virtue of their smaller size and relative youth, do not have large infrastructures, nor do they possess the capacity of larger pharmaceutical companies, so have to decide which assets and investments to pursue. They simply do not have resources to interrogate everything. Challenging additional investments at each phase and evaluating the returns for each asset are skills that our main cohort need just as much as the expansion cohort.

While many companies recognise the increasing costs of their R&D organisations, it remains challenging to allocate fully all costs to projects and programmes, particularly for internal resources. In the absence of this kind of data it is hard for R&D leadership to make truly fact-based decisions on investments and the likelihood of returns. R&D leadership should challenge IT, functional groups and finance to resolve to provide the necessary data.

The challenge for companies in the extension cohort is to retain their nimble and flexible approach to R&D while pursuing growth and expansion. However, there is an inherent risk that these organisations become overly complex as they increase in size and lose their R&D productivity advantages.

Deloitte has investigated the impact of two other factors which are applying additional pressure to R&D returns:

• the requirements for business leaders to balance R&D investment with shareholder needs

• the risk of pricing uncertainty in markets that do not currently regulate the pricing of pharmaceuticals.

The challenge for companies in the extension cohort is to retain their nimble and flexible approach to R&D while pursuing growth and expansion.
Companies are now more likely to return cash to shareholders than they are to invest it in R&D, product licensing and company acquisitions. Our analysis shows that cash investment trends as a proportion of cash generated across the cohort have varied over three periods from 2004 through 2014. First, there was a period of relative market stability (2004-08), then industry consolidation due to significant M&A activity (2008-10) and, since 2010, market austerity driven by the onset of the financial crisis (see Figure 14).

Despite the ongoing decline in forecast R&D returns, the original cohort’s R&D investment has continued to increase steadily as a proportion of cash generated, from 25.5 per cent in 2004 to 29.4 per cent in 2014. This suggests that the cohort companies either believe that R&D is a good use of cash coming into the business, or are yet to make tough decisions regarding R&D investment.

Companies are now more likely to return cash generated to shareholders via a combination of dividends and share buybacks than they are to invest in company acquisitions, product licences and internal R&D (see Figure 14). This is the first time this has occurred since the onset of the financial crisis and highlights the value that investors are currently placing on a steady cash stream. However, this could also indicate a lack of confidence on the part of both investors and companies in potential R&D returns.

Figure 14. Allocation of cash generated across the cohort, 2004-14

![Graph showing cash allocation across the cohort from 2004 to 2014, with three periods labeled: Relative stability 2004-08, Consolidation 2008-10, Austerity 2010-14.]

Source: Deloitte LLP
Declining peak sales are the major contributor to the cohort’s reduced productivity
Since 2010, decline in asset values has had the greatest negative impact on R&D returns (see Figure 15).

Recreating higher peak sales across portfolios, previously seen in large primary care markets such as respiratory or cardiovascular, is difficult and takes time. The number of competitors from both NMEs and generics has never been higher, while patient populations are becoming smaller and more distinct through the use of new diagnostics and real world evidence studies. It is unlikely that peak sales will reach the levels achieved in the last decade. We expect that the industry will need to continue its focus on optimising costs to deliver higher levels of R&D return and productivity.

Potential pricing risk is already likely to be part of the discussion between R&D and Commercial organisations on individual assets. This conversation should also be part of the larger, portfolio view discussion as it has implications for the types of investments companies could be making while assets progress through development or as part of post-launch commitments.

Figure 15. Overall impact of pipeline factors on change in IRR 2010-15

Source: Deloitte LLP
Our report this year highlights the R&D challenges faced by the largest companies in the pharmaceutical industry. The relentless pressure on sales and healthcare budgets, combined with the ever increasing costs of discovering, researching, developing and delivering products to market looks set to continue. Lower R&D returns have already affected the investment approach of CEOs and CFOs. For example, cash generated by the business is increasingly being used for share buybacks instead of raising investment in R&D.

While the outlook appears pessimistic, the solutions could be relatively simple: a relentless focus on optimising programme and project costs, an agenda to accelerate development timelines and simplify the core processes and systems across R&D, and a consistent approach to TA investment.

Costs
• The urgent challenge for R&D leaders is to measure the true costs of their pipeline assets and make value-based decisions as well as science-based decisions, at all critical points in the development cycle. They also need to ensure that additional programmes take on a marginal cost rather than replicating the same costs thereby increasing productivity and returns.

• The extension cohort demonstrates the ability to deliver outperforming returns with limited infrastructure, footprint and capacity. This not only allows them to operate more nimbly and flexibly, it focuses their choices rather than filling available capacity with potentially lower productivity assets. The challenge for large pharmaceutical companies is to allow their external innovation models to work seamlessly with their world-class regulatory, development and commercial functions.

Timelines
• Our cohort analysis is based on a standard set of industry review cycles and benchmarks, but we see possibilities to create value earlier using fast track approval pathways, adaptive licensing and staggered launch programmes across small patient populations. There is a significant opportunity to realise revenues sooner in the asset life cycle but this will need to be adjusted for launching into smaller, targeted patient populations.

• As specialised therapies make up a larger proportion of the portfolios of big pharmaceutical companies, studies have become more complex and time consuming. For example, recruiting and executing studies for complex specialty indications are one key contributor to the increased cost and time associated with clinical development. Companies need to use advanced protocol design tools and strong governance models to control study times and the variable cost of development better.

Returns
• The revenues expected from the assets in our analysis are a factor of volume and value. We have observed companies in our cohort proposing different approaches ranging from high volume strategies including developing TAs, to low volume strategies with assets priced at a premium.

• We have seen the extension cohort demonstrate the value of focus, concentrating their R&D efforts in areas of significant unmet medical need. Large pharmaceutical companies should use their scale and capability in a focused set of TAs where they can be a market leader and gain competitive advantage. The winners in the future R&D landscape will be those that can deliver holistic healthcare solutions that change patient outcomes dramatically.

Companies that exhibit an end-to-end understanding of the disease, patient behaviours, and targeting and delivery mechanisms will be best positioned to capitalise on this opportunity.

While this appears to be a daunting challenge, the extension cohort shows the levels of R&D returns that are achievable if some of their attributes can be replicated within larger organisations. Although the smaller pipelines of the extension cohort cannot provide the returns (in absolute sales values) needed by larger companies, there are lessons to be learned on how to manage costs to realise economies of scale, rather than replicating every cost for every asset.

Part 4: Conclusions
Appendix 1: Peer benchmarks and analysis

At a company level there continues to be wide variation in performance across a number of R&D KPIs

Figure 16. Comparison of static IRR results by company, 2010-15

![Static IRR comparison chart](image)

Source: Deloitte LLP

Figure 17. Three-year rolling average outflow and inflow per late stage pipeline asset, 2010-15

![Inflow and outflow chart](image)

Source: Deloitte LLP
Figure 18. Yearly cost to develop an asset from discovery to launch, 2010-15

Source: Deloitte LLP

Figure 19. Yearly average peak sales per late stage pipeline asset, 2010-15

Source: Deloitte LLP
Figure 20. Allocation of cash generated across the cohort, 2001-14

Source: Deloitte LLP
Appendix 2: Methodology

Deloitte has built an interactive model to calculate the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the companies and assets of interest. This part of the report contains a top-level summary of the methodology. A detailed description can be found in the 2013 report at: www.deloitte.co.uk/measuringrndreturns2013

Company cohort
The cohort has remained consistent since 2010 and comprises the top 12 publicly-listed, research-based life science companies measured by 2008-09 R&D spend: Amgen, AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, Sanofi and Takeda.

Extension cohort
The extension cohort comprises four, mid- to large-cap companies. These have been selected based on perceived recent performance and pharmaceutical R&D spend. These companies all fall within the top 25 pharmaceutical companies based on R&D spend for 2012 to 2014.

Assets evaluated
The analysis focuses on each company’s late stage pipeline defined as the set of assets that are in Phase III clinical development or submitted for approval as of 30 April for each relevant year. Given the increasing potential of assets that have been given breakthrough therapy designation by the US Food and Drug Administration progressing straight from Phase II to submission, this year’s report also includes assets in Phase II with breakthrough therapy designation. The types of assets included are:

- new chemical entities (NCEs)
- new biological entities (NBEs)
- significant line extensions expected to result in a measurable uplift in revenues
- reformulations
- fixed dose combinations
- biosimilars.

For all assets included in the analysis, their origin was assessed and they were categorised as self-originated, in-licensed, part of a joint venture/co-development or acquired.

Methodology amendments
No methodology amendments have been made between the 2014 and 2015 report. For any changes in methodology between the 2014 and previous reports please refer to the 2013 report at: www.deloitte.co.uk/measuringrndreturns2013

Prior year restatements
We are continually striving to improve the methodology and modelling that underpins this report. During quality review checks we identified errors in previous data which has resulted in restatements of figures from prior year’s reports:

1. Results of company K have been restated for 2012 and 2013 – 2012 static IRR has been reduced from 9.6 per cent to 6.8 per cent, and 2013 static IRR from 7.7 per cent to 5.2 per cent.

2. Cohort average returns have been restated for 2012 and 2013 – reduced from 7.6 per cent to 7.3 per cent in 2012 and 5.1 per cent to 4.8 per cent in 2013.

3. Adjustments to the impacts of existing assets and R&D costs from 2013 to 2014. Overall yearly returns figures are not altered.
**Principles applied to the model**

**Currency**
All currency calculations have been made in US dollars. Financial Times yearly average rates have been used for conversion of other currencies into US dollars.

**Taxation**
IRR has been calculated based on post tax inflows and outflows. Company specific tax rates have been calculated based on average effective tax rates over the ten years to 31 December 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 or 2015, adjusted for non-recurring items, such as litigation costs, impairments and in-process R&D expense.

**IRR calculation**
IRR is a measure which equates the cost of developing an investment and the expected benefits that the investment will deliver. The methodology assesses three IRR measures: static returns, average returns and dynamic returns.

**Yearly, static returns**
Calculated by equating cash outflows with cash inflows to generate an IRR value, with a separate IRR value generated for each year under investigation.

Static returns is calculated for a defined basket of late stage assets by estimating the expenses associated with developing the assets and the likely potential returns that they will deliver. This is achieved using estimates of each company’s:

- annual R&D expenses (cash outflows) for the prior ten years – which calculates the cost associated with bringing the basket of assets to a particular stage of development
- annual risk adjusted revenues (cash inflows) forecast for the future 21 years – which estimates the likely returns that the basket of assets will deliver.

**Average returns**
Average returns are calculated on a weighted three-year rolling average basis by aligning the individual inflows and outflows used in the static returns figure for the three periods included in the rolling average.

**Dynamic returns**
Calculating the dynamic returns allows the movement in static returns from one year to the next to be reconciled and also quantifies the key elements driving this change. It is calculated for five time periods: 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15, and focuses on the same basket of late stage pipeline assets as static returns. However, the basket of assets changes year on year due to the movement of assets into and out of the late stage pipeline.

The elements driving change in IRR can be categorised into two groups, based on whether they impact cash outflows or cash inflows.

**Cash outflow elements**
The four outflow elements driving change in IRR comprise:

- R&D cost – changes to R&D costs for self-originated assets
- cost phasing – changes to how R&D costs are allocated over the historical ten-year time period
- licensing – increases or decreases in licensing expenses associated with the basket of assets under review
- tax rates – alterations to the company specific tax rates based on average effective tax rates over the historical ten-year period.

**Cash inflow elements**
The five inflow elements driving change in IRR comprise:

- terminated – future revenues lost from late stage pipeline due to termination of assets
- approved – transfer of revenues to the commercial portfolio due to assets leaving late stage pipeline and being launched
- existing – increases or decreases in forecast revenues for assets which remain within the late stage pipeline
- new – revenues associated with new assets entering the late stage pipeline
- margin – changes in a company’s average cash operating margin.
Model inputs: R&D cash outflows
Cash outflows were calculated separately for self-originated, in-licensed and acquired assets.

Self-originated assets

1. R&D costs have been obtained from publicly available company reports based on applicable GAAP at the time results were issued (either local GAAP applicable in the country of incorporation, IFRS or US GAAP).

2. R&D costs recognised through profit and loss accounts are assumed to equal cash flows, unless a non-cash expense is separately disclosed (e.g. write-off of in process R&D charge recorded under US GAAP) in which case this has been excluded from the R&D cost.

3. Following a business combination, R&D costs include those of the enlarged group, in line with the publicly available company reports (see below for pre-acquisition costs).

4. The use of publicly available data limited the model to the use of industry average cycle times and cost allocation when calculating R&D costs over the ten-year period; GlobaData proprietary data was used for 2015 (see Table 1). This methodology incorporates the cost of attrition of assets from the initial cohort at discovery to the late stage pipeline as at 1 January for each respective year.

5. R&D costs have not been included within the model beyond 31 December 2014.

Assets acquired through in-licensing
For assets which have been in-licensed from a third party, any upfront payments have been included in the relevant year of acquisition. In-licensing information was provided by GlobalData. In most cases financial information was limited due to the commercial sensitivity of deal information. As publicly available data typically does not include the timing or quantum of future contingent payments, the total amount of these costs associated with the relevant in-licensed assets have been assumed to be incurred at their maximum potential amounts on commencement of sales of the assets. Any costs expended in developing the product subsequent to the in-licensing have been included as per the internally developed assets.

Where deal values have not been disclosed, industry averages by therapy area have been utilised as a proxy for the costs of acquiring IP. Industry average royalty rates per stage of development at the time of deal formation have also been utilised.

For deals involving a basket of assets, deal values have been weighted according to the number of assets for deals done in early stage, or, for late stage deals where lifetime sales forecasts are available, weighted according to the revenue contribution from the individual constituents of the deal.

Table 1. Industry average benchmarks, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R&amp;D cost allocation</th>
<th>R&amp;D cycle times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discovery to first toxicity dose</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preclinical to Phase II</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III and submission</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Deloitte LLP and GlobalData proprietary data
Assets acquired as part of a business combination

R&D costs arising from assets acquired as part of a business combination enacted by an entity have been included in the model if considered material to the calculation of IRR.

1. R&D costs incurred after the date of the business combination have been included as per the internally developed assets noted above.

2. R&D costs incurred prior to the date of the business combination have been included separately in the model obtained from publicly available company reports based on applicable GAAP at the time results were issued (either local GAAP applicable in the country of incorporation, IFRS or US GAAP).

Private companies that have been acquired were not considered as access to the required financial data is not widely available. The cost associated with the acquisition of an asset as part of a business combination has not been included as the acquired company's pre-acquisition R&D cost is included as per the internally developed assets. Further, publicly available data does not typically include the fair value attributed to each of the assets acquired. Any costs expended in developing the product subsequent to the business combination have been included as per the internally developed assets.

Model inputs: Forecast cash inflows

Revenue forecasts

1. Company revenues were forecast for a 21-year timeframe for each time period under investigation, for example, for 2015 models – revenues forecast from 1 January 2015 – 31 December 2035.

2. 2015 revenue forecasts were calculated by GlobalData using a combination of forecasting methodologies, including analyst consensus forecasts and proprietary patient-based forecasting models to generate revenues to 2035.

3. Revenue forecasts have been risk adjusted for Phase III and submission success rates specific to therapeutic areas (GlobalData proprietary data).

4. Sales forecasts were determined in July 2015; forecasted revenues are accurate as of this date.

5. After reaching peak sales, standard erosion curves were applied depending on the type of asset considered. Different erosion curves have been developed for each asset type: small molecules (chemical entities) and large molecules (biological entities).

6. Available patent information was extracted by GlobalData from GlobalData’s Pharma eTrack and other public patent sources for each asset. Accurate patent data can be difficult to locate, therefore a number of rules were defined to ensure consistency across the assets.

Margin applied to forecast revenues

Inflows have been determined by applying an average cash operating margin. This has been calculated using operating profits reported in publicly available company reports over the three-years preceding each year, 2010, 2011, 212, 2013, 2014 and 2015.

Modelling assumptions

The use of revenue forecast data and publicly available information regarding pipelines and deal information presents certain challenges and risks associated with the construction of revenue forecasts and distribution of R&D costs within the life sciences industry. These challenges and risks are summarised in the detailed methodology which can be found in the 2013 report: www.deloitte.co.uk/measuringrndreturns2013

Assumptions used in Part 3 of report

In addition to the core modelling, the following methodology has been employed in performing additional analyses for this year’s report:

Cash investment trends

Consolidated cash flow statements for the cohort of companies have been obtained and analysed using the following assumptions to comment on cash investment trends within the industry:

1. Where cash flows were reported in a currency other than USD the cash flow figures were converted to USD using the year-end exchange rates.

2. R&D has been considered as an investment of cash. To split this out from cash from operations the Profit and Loss, R&D value has been used as a proxy for cash spent on R&D and added back to cash from operations.
1. Relentless scientific inquiry in drug development is shifting the odds in the fight against some of the world’s most challenging diseases, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Key Facts Card 2015. See also: http://www.phrma.org/fact-sheets/key-facts-card-2015#sthash.ZzjpXAlZ.dpuf


Contacts

Authors
Colin Terry
Director, Life Sciences R&D Advisory
Deloitte
+44 (0) 20 7007 0658
colterry@deloitte.co.uk

Karen Young
Senior Manager
UK Centre for Health Solutions
+44 (0) 20 7007 9457
karyoung@deloitte.co.uk

Kevin Dondarski
Manager
Deloitte Consulting LLP
+1 (973) 602 5656
kdondarski@deloitte.com

Mark Stockbridge
Manager
Deloitte
+44 (0) 20 7303 7539
mstockbridge@deloitte.co.uk

Oliver Whight
Assistant Manager
UK Centre for Health Solutions
+44 (0) 20 7007 2492
owhight@deloitte.co.uk

Deloitte
Neil Lesser
Principal, US Life Sciences R&D Strategy
Deloitte Consulting LLP
+1 (215) 446 4364
nlesser@deloitte.com

Julian Remnant
Partner, EMEA Life Sciences R&D Advisory Lead
Deloitte
+44 (0) 20 7303 3303
jremnant@deloitte.co.uk

Hanno Ronte
Partner,
Monitor Deloitte
+44 (0) 20 7007 2540
hronte@deloitte.co.uk

Daniel Ressler
Principal, US Life Sciences R&D
Practice Leader
Deloitte Consulting LLP
+1 (215) 299 5210
dressler@deloitte.com

John Haughey
Life Sciences and Healthcare Leader, UK and Switzerland
+44 (0) 20 7303 7472
jhaughey@deloitte.co.uk

Mike Standing
Life Sciences and Healthcare Leader, EMEA
+44 (0) 20 7007 3178
mstanding@deloitte.co.uk

Karen Taylor
Director, Centre for Health Solutions
+44 (0) 20 7007 3680
kartaylor@deloitte.co.uk

GlobalData
Sean X. Hu
VP and Head of Consulting, Americas
GlobalData
+1 (908) 578 5128
shu@globaldata.com

Neil Coleman
Principal Consultant, EMEA
GlobalData
+44 (0) 20 7406 6760
ncoleman@globaldata.com

James Coutcher
Global Head of Pharma
GlobalData
+1 (401) 262 5343
jcoutcher@globaldata.com

Deloitte contributors
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Notes
To start a new section, hold down the apple+shift keys and click to release this object and type the section title in the box below.