Blame for the drought has been placed on climate change as well as on the El Nino season. However, a new study suggests that it also has much to do with the deforestation of the Amazon basin. That is, the canal is highly dependent on rainfall, which maintains water levels in lakes that supply water to the canal. In recent years, due to deforestation in the Amazon, rainfall levels have been historically low. The result is that the water levels in the lakes adjacent to the canal have fallen to record lows.
The Amazon rainforest, the largest such forest in the world, has been sufficiently depleted, so much so that it is likely at a tipping point where it will no longer produce large volumes of rainfall. This is according to several studies by leading scientists. The result is that, in 2023, the Amazon experienced its worst drought in recorded history. And, of course, deforestation is contributing to climate change by reducing the number of trees that can absorb carbon.
Given this, the future of the Panama Canal is now in doubt. If water levels in the canal remain low, or become even lower, it will be hugely disruptive to global trade. The largest customer of the canal is US-based shipping followed by China-based shipping. The US shipping usually involves goods transported between the West Coast and the East and South coasts. Without access to the canal, there will be more demand for ground transportation within the United States. This will include rail and trucking.
As for goods coming from China, they could be delivered to West Coast ports for ground transportation to the rest of the United States. Or they could go around South America. Finally, energy products are exported from ports in New Orleans and Houston to Asia. Without the Panama Canal, they might travel across the Atlantic, around Africa, and toward Asia. Either way, these alternative routes would likely cause delays, add to costs, and possibly lead to inadequate capacity.
The irony is that, earlier in this century, a massive investment was made in widening the Panama Canal to accommodate the latest large container ships and tankers. Now, it appears that this investment might not pay off. As a resident of Los Angeles, I recall considerable concern that the widening of the canal would divert ships from the very large and economically important ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Now, there will likely be a significant increase in demand for port facilities in southern California.
Plus, Chinese exporters have taken advantage of a loophole in the law that allows packages valued at under US$800 to arrive in the United States tariff-free. Several Chinese companies, such as Shein, sell goods online directly to US consumers and businesses, sending packages that are valued under the US$800 threshold. Even US online sellers such as Amazon allow Chinese companies to sell goods through their websites. Thus, the majority of packages entering the United States using this loophole now come from China. In 2022, 685 million such packages were shipped to the United States, with between 60% and 80% of them coming from China or Hong Kong. It is estimated that the number of packages might have been about one billion in 2023.
There are calls in the US Congress for closing this loophole. Moreover, former President Trump has vetted the idea of imposing a 60% tariff on all imports from China. One reason the 25% tariffs have not been as impactful as expected is that there is currently excess production capacity in China, putting downward pressure on prices. Yet a 60% tariff could be very impactful, raising prices substantially and putting pressure on producers to shift production elsewhere. That could be problematic given the vast investment that has been made in existing and highly efficient supply chains in China. On the other hand, higher tariffs will create a big incentive to boost shipments of inputs to Southeast Asia for final assembly, thereby evading tariffs while supplying products to the United States.
What is happening? The shift in trade patterns reflects changes in supply chain design. Many global companies, fearful of supply chain disruption due to geopolitical tensions, are diversifying their supply chains away from China. Indeed, inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) into China fell sharply last year. FDI in Southeast Asia and India increased. The result is a shift in trade. Still, many of the products exported from Southeast Asia and India to the United States are made with inputs that come from China. Thus, China’s role is not necessarily diminishing. It is simply shifting.
Also, exports from other Asian countries are shifting. For example, exports from Japan and South Korea to China have fallen. As a result, the United States has become the biggest destination for Japanese exports for the first time in four years. And South Korean exports to the United States are now larger than Korean exports to China for the first time in 20 years.
For China, trade with the United States, Europe, and Japan is now of lesser importance than previously. Instead, China’s trade with Southeast Asia, Brazil, and Russia have increased sharply. Going forward, it is likely that this trend will continue and possibly accelerate, depending on the trade policies of the United States, Europe, and Japan. The outcome of the US election could have a big impact on US trade policy.
Deflation or very low inflation either reflects weak demand and/or excess supply. In the case of China, it is probably a bit of both. Deflation is worrisome in that it boosts real interest rates, increases the real value of debts, discourages consumers from spending, and hurts business confidence. The cure for deflation is often to boost money supply growth through easier monetary policy. That is, by cutting interest rates.
In the past year, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the country’s central bank, has cut rates and cut the required reserve ratio for commercial banks in an effort to spur more credit market activity. Yet this has not prevented deflation. Some analysts suggest that China is suffering from a liquidity trap in which lower interest rates are ignored as consumers and businesses continue to hoard cash. Instead, many people suggest that fiscal stimulus is needed to boost demand. That would entail increased government expenditure, especially with the goal of boosting consumer demand. Yet given the high level of local government debt in China, the government in Beijing might be reluctant to boost its own deficit. It might fear that it will be called upon to support troubled local governments, thereby boosting the deficit.
Meanwhile, the government has dismissed worries about persistent deflation. It says that the current situation has much to do with volatile food prices and that higher inflation will return in 2024. On the other hand, critics worry that the persistent crisis in the property market, combined with a lack of confidence that growth will accelerate, suggest that deflation or low inflation will likely persist absent a dramatic change in fiscal policy.
As for fiscal policy, it is not moving in an expansionary direction. In 2021, 2022, and 2023, government spending as a share of GDP declined from the previous year. This partly had to do with reduced revenue due to the property crisis. Local government revenue is down sharply, putting pressure on the central government.
The weakness of the consumer sector is a concern to the government, which has called on employers to boost wages. Although Japanese inflation is now relatively high compared to the last 40 years, there is a widespread view that it reflects supply problems rather than excess demand. Plus, inflation is already abating. As such, an acceleration in wages is not seen as necessarily inflationary. Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) is now expected to tighten monetary policy sometime soon. That, in turn, will likely lead to a rise in the value of the yen, thereby reducing import prices and suppressing inflation.
Meanwhile, a government report says that Japan will require 6.7 million foreign workers by 2040 in order to maintain adequate economic growth. Although the government has taken various steps to encourage people to have more babies, and provided incentives for boosting female labor force participation, it has failed to reduce the shortage of labor. Thus, immigration is now widely seen as the solution.
Still, at 2% of the population, immigrants are a much smaller share of the population in Japan than in most developed economies. About one-quarter of foreign workers are from Vietnam, the largest group. Plus, foreign workers are not encouraged to stay and become Japanese citizens. Japan has long prided itself on cultural homogeneity. Thus, a more diverse population is likely seen by some as disruptive. On the other hand, absent immigration, Japan could see a sharp decline in population and serious fiscal headaches in the years to come.
The US government provides two reports on the job market: one based on a survey of establishments; the other based on a survey of households. First, let’s consider the establishment survey. It indicates that, in January, 353,000 nonfarm jobs were created, including 317,000 in the private sector. It was the strongest job growth since January 2023. In addition, the December numbers were upwardly revised, indicating December job growth of 333,000.
By industry, employment grew 23,000 in manufacturing, 45,200 in retailing, 15,500 in transportation and warehousing, 8,000 in financial services, 74,000 in professional and business services, 70,300 in health care, 11,000 in leisure and hospitality, and 36,000 in government. The rise in professional and business services was almost entirely full-time permanent jobs, with only very modest growth for temporary services.
The establishment survey also reported that average hourly earnings were up 4.5% from a year earlier, up from 4.3% in the previous month and the fastest wage growth since September 2023. Earnings were up 0.6% from the previous month. The acceleration in wage growth reflects the tightness of the job market.
In addition to the report on average hourly earnings, an excellent measure of the cost of employing workers is the employment cost index (ECI). It measures changes in the cost of compensation, breaking it down by wages and benefits. The latest index indicates that wage inflation remains too high for comfort but is decelerating. Specifically, the ECI increased 4.2% in December versus a year earlier. This included a 4.3% increase in wages and a 3.8% increase in the cost of benefits.
However, the ECI increased 0.9% in the last three months, which means it rose at less than an annual rate of 4%. Hence, it appears that compensation inflation started to decelerate in the last quarter. Moreover, since 2022 there has been a very sharp deceleration in health benefit inflation in the private sector, now only 1.8%. The slow rise in the cost of health benefits for private sector workers is notable given that health costs had previously been rising very rapidly. If continued, this bodes well for reducing overall compensation inflation.
With wages rising faster than inflation, workers are now seeing a real (inflation-adjusted) increase in wages. Specifically, real wages were up 1% in December versus a year earlier. On the one hand, this boosts consumer purchasing power, enabling continued growth in consumer spending. On the other hand, the rise in real wages is a concern for the Federal Reserve as it indicates that labor markets are contributing to inflation. The Fed has consistently expressed concern that a tight labor market, by driving up wages, will inhibit its ability to reduce inflation to the 2% target. The Fed has indicated that a tight monetary policy is needed to loosen the job market and thereby suppress wage pressure. So far, this is not happening. As such, it is likely that the Fed will keep rates high for longer, at least until the job market weakens and/or inflation declines further.
Based on the latest earnings data, investors no longer expect the Fed to cut rates in the next few months. Hence, bond yields increased after the employment report was released, with the yield on the 10-year bond up 19 basis points in one day. The value of the US dollar rose as investors now expect the interest-rate gap between the US and other countries to either widen or stay high.
In December, the job openings rate (the share of available jobs that are unfilled) was 5.4%, unchanged from November and up from 5.3% in October. Moreover, the number of job openings increased from 8.925 million in November to 9.026 million in December, the highest number since September. Although the job openings rate is down sharply from the historic peak of 7.4% reached in March 2022, it has been relatively stable in the last six months.
Moreover, if one excludes the post-pandemic period, the current job openings rate is the highest on record. In other words, the job market remains tight and is not getting any looser—despite persistent tight monetary policy on the part of the Fed. Indeed, the Fed’s goal in recent months was to loosen the job market, hoping to ease wage pressure and thereby allow inflation to recede further. Instead, the job market remains tight.
Meanwhile, the job openings rate varies considerably by industry. The highest job openings rates are in health care and social assistance (7.7%) and our own professional services (7%). The lowest rates are in state and local education (2.5%), wholesale trade (3.5%), and nondurable manufacturing (3.8%).
Finally, the government also publishes the quits rate, which is the share of jobs that people voluntarily leave each month. Recall that, in 2022, there was much talk about the so-called great resignation in which people were quick to voluntarily exit jobs. There was concern that too many people simply didn’t want to work, especially at a time when the labor force participation rate was historically low. That has changed. Participation is back up, close to the pre-pandemic level. Moreover, since mid-2022 the quits rate has been falling and is now at a level consistent with the pre-pandemic era. Specifically, the quits rate in December was 2.2%, the same as in November and similar to the rates seen in 2017 through 2019. Evidently people still want to work.
Powell said these things right after the Fed announced that it is holding the benchmark Federal Funds interest rate steady. The rate is set between 5.25% and 5.5%. The decision of the committee was unanimous. The committee stated that it “does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably towards 2%.”In addition, Chairman Powell said that a March rate cut (at the next policy meeting) is highly unlikely. It seems more likely that the Fed will wait at least until the second half of this year before acting.
In the fourth quarter, labor productivity (output per hour worked) increased at a 3.2% annualized rate from the previous quarter. Productivity was up 2.7% from a year earlier. Surprisingly, productivity grew faster in service industries than in manufacturing, the opposite of the historical pattern. Moreover, unit labor costs (the labor cost of producing an additional unit of output) grew only 0.5%, boding well for low inflation.
This is all good news. What we don’t know, however, is if this trend will be sustained in the quarters to come. Some people point to generative AI as likely to boost productivity. That is probably true, but not necessarily in the next year or two. Investment in AI is a longer-term phenomenon that will most likely bear fruit over a period of years. Indeed, Fed Chairman Powell dismissed the idea that generative AI will boost productivity in the short term.
The European Union (EU) reported that, in January, consumer prices were up 2.8% from a year earlier and down 0.4% from the previous month. When volatile food and energy prices are excluded, core prices were up 3.3%, the lowest since March 2022. Core prices were down 0.9% from the previous month. Notably, non-energy industrial goods prices were up only 2% from a year earlier and were down a staggering 2.4% from the previous month.
So far, these are terrific numbers. Yet what spooked investors is that service prices were up 4% from a year earlier, the same as in December and November. In other words, service prices are not decelerating as are other prices. Moreover, services tend to be labor-intensive while wages are rising sharply. Thus, the ECB will likely be reluctant to cut interest rates until wage pressure moderates.
One concern about inflation is that the crisis in the Red Sea, by boosting the cost of shipping goods from Asia to Europe, will significantly increase European inflation, thereby changing the calculus of the ECB. Indeed, the cost of shipping a container from China to Northern Europe has roughly quadrupled since October. Memories of the inflationary impact of supply chain disruption during the pandemic remain raw. Indeed, it is reported that the rerouting of ships from the Red Sea has led to an increase in suppliers’ delivery times for the first time in a year. Still, companies continued to draw down inventories, evidently in response to only modest demand. The fact that demand remains relatively weak could help to mitigate the potentially inflationary impact of the Red Sea crisis.
Finally, it is worth noting that, despite the sharp rise in shipping costs, the cost of shipping a container from China to Europe is now only about one third of the level reached in early 2022. Thus, the inflationary impact of the current crisis will not likely be anything akin to what happened during the pandemic.
The principal source of weakness was Germany. The German economy failed to grow in both the second and third quarters and declined by 0.3% in the fourth quarter. Although all EU economies have been hit by tight monetary policy and weak credit markets, Germany has suffered the consequences of the energy shock more than other countries. The end of access to cheap Russian energy has changed the calculus for heavy industry that, previously, derived competitiveness from cheap energy. Now, many big companies in Germany are investing abroad rather than in Germany.
Meanwhile, the French economy failed to grow in both the third and fourth quarters. However, growth was positive elsewhere. Italy grew 0.2% in the fourth quarter while Spain grew a strong 0.6%, Belgium 0.4%, Portugal 0.8%, and Austria 0.2%.
Going forward there is reason for cautious optimism about Europe. Real wages are now rising after a period of decline. This will likely boost consumer spending. In addition, households retain considerable excess savings following the pandemic. If they dip into that savings, it will boost spending. Moreover, it is widely expected that the ECB will cut interest rates later this year. If so, that will likely boost credit market activity and strengthen business investment. Finally, assuming energy prices do not rebound, then it appears that the worst of the energy crisis is over.