This is not a new insight. Economists have known this for generations. One can reasonably make the argument that there is nothing wrong with a trade deficit, especially for a mature and dominant economy like the United States. Still, persistent large trade deficits lead to increases in the net external indebtedness of the United States. If that debt is used to fund profitable domestic investment, which is partly the case, then it is not a bad thing. If, however, it is used to fund government consumption, one can argue that it will likely have a negative impact on US living standards in the very long run.
Consequently, there is an argument for reducing the trade deficit. But it is not an argument for tariffs, which are unlikely to significantly reduce the trade deficit. Rather, it is an argument for reducing the government’s budget deficit. That is, if the Congress raises taxes and/or cuts spending, thereby reducing government borrowing, the gap between saving and investment declines, leading to a smaller trade deficit. This means a slower rise in the net indebtedness of the United States. Thus, if the goal is to rebalance the external accounts of the United States, the focus should be on domestic savings rather than external trade rules.
On trade, Powell said that the tariffs have been much larger than anticipated. Yet the policy continues to evolve and the potential economic impact, consequently, remains uncertain. He said that “if the large increases in tariffs that have been announced are sustained, they are likely to generate a rise in inflation, a slowdown in economic growth, and an increase in unemployment. The effects on inflation could be short-lived—reflecting a one-time shift in the price level. It is also possible that the inflationary effects could instead be more persistent. Avoiding that outcome will depend on the size of the tariff effects, on how long it takes for them to pass through fully into prices, and, ultimately, on keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored.”
While investors were not surprised by the Fed’s inaction, there is now a strong expectation, as evidenced by futures markets, that the Fed will engage in multiple interest-rate reductions in the second half of the year. That expectation reflects a view that the economy will likely weaken and that the Fed will view any sudden increase in inflation as a temporary effect of tariffs.
Still, US Treasury Secretary Bessent said that, in the present circumstances, the United States has the upper hand because it buys more from China than it sells. China, on the other hand, appears confident given that it exports to many other countries beside the United States and that the trade war offers an opportunity to improve relations with countries that are unhappy with US action. For example, China has sought to improve relations in Southeast Asia following the threat of high US tariffs on imports from that region.
Moreover, even though China’s purchases of US exports are modest, China-based revenue of US companies is massive, potentially giving China a tool with which to put pressure on the United States. China-based revenue of the companies on the S&P 500 index is roughly six times US exports of goods and services to China. At more than one trillion dollars, this revenue source is of vital importance to many large US companies. China could, theoretically, make life difficult for these companies. So far, this has not happened.
Another potential source of leverage for China is its massive holdings of US Treasury and other dollar-denominated securities. Some observers have suggested that China could do considerable damage to the US economy if it engaged in a fire sale of US bonds. Yet a Chinese sale would result in a capital loss for China. Moreover, it is not clear where China would park money after exiting the US bond market. There is no good alternative in terms of depth and liquidity. Plus, given China’s massive volume of exports, which remain mostly valued in US dollars, China cannot afford to reduce its exposure to the US dollar—and least not yet. Consequently, a rapid Chinese sale of US bonds seems unlikely.
The deal leaves in place the across-the-board 10% US tariff on imports from the United Kingdom. However, it lowers the US tariff on imports of British cars from 25% to 10%. At the same time, the deal limits the 10% tariff to the first 100,000 British cars sold in the United States. Last year, 120,000 British cars were sold in the United States. Hence, this is effectively a quantitative restriction.
There is a long history of such quantitative restrictions. What we know from the past is that limiting the supply of competitively priced products leads to higher prices. In the 1980s, the United States and Japan agreed on a voluntary cap on the number of cars Japan exported to the United States. The result was a significant increase in the average price of cars sold in the United States. The new US-UK deal will, at the least, cause a sizable increase in the prices of British cars sold in the United States.
The deal also provides that steel and aluminum exported from the United Kingdom to the United States will face zero tariff, down from the current 25%. In exchange, the United Kingdom will liberalize imports of US food products while leaving in place US rules on food safety. In addition, the United Kingdom will remove a tariff on imports of US-produced ethanol. The two sides also agreed to work on a future digital trade pact.
Overall, the deal leaves in place a high degree of protection but does liberalize trade in some product areas. It does not provide for a vast increase in US market access to the United Kingdom, which presumably was the goal of tariff negotiations. One reason an agreement was reached relatively quickly is that the United Kingdom does not have a trade surplus with the United States. As such, it was not facing the threat of a very high tariff. On April 2, when President Trump proposed such tariffs, it only imposed a 10% tariff on the United Kingdom—which remains in place under this deal. As such, it is not clear if this deal provides a useful template for deals between the United States and other countries.
Meanwhile, other countries might be wary of unenforceable deals. The US had free trade agreements with Mexico, Canada, South Korea, and Israel, but still chose to impose high tariffs. Plus, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which used to adjudicate trade disputes between countries and was able to impose penalties for violations of trade rules, has been neutered by US unwillingness to appoint members of a panel on dispute resolution. Thus, there is no current method to avoid dissolution of agreements.
First, PMIs are forward-looking indicators meant to signal the direction of activity in the broad services and manufacturing sectors. They are based on sub-indices such as output, new orders, export orders, employment, pricing, inventories, and sentiment. A reading above 50 indicates growing activity. The higher the number, the faster the growth. S&P Global, which publishes the PMIs, released data for global manufacturing. Here’s the data:
The global PMI for manufacturing fell from 50.3 in March to 49.8 in April, indicating a contraction in activity. The PMI for the manufacture of intermediate goods fell especially sharply. This suggests disruption of supply chains. For the overall PMI, the sub-index for output indicated growth. However, the sub-indices for new orders, employment, and inventories indicated contraction.
Of the 32 countries analyzed, 12 had manufacturing PMIs above 50, indicating growing activity. The highest PMIs were for India, Greece, Philippines, and Ireland. The remaining 20 countries all experienced contraction. The deepest contractions were in Mexico, Canada, Myanmar, and the United Kingdom.
Now let’s look at some of the world’s major economies: In the United States, the manufacturing PMI was unchanged in April at 50.2, a level signifying almost no growth. Yet the sub-index for output indicated decline while sentiment worsened to a 10-month low. Meanwhile, output prices were up at the fastest pace in two years. Input charges increased sharply as well, mainly due to tariffs. S&P Global commented that “tariffs were widely blamed for a slump in export orders and curbed spending among customers more broadly amid rising uncertainty.” In addition, it noted that “manufacturers are responding to … changing demand, supply and cost conditions by raising their selling prices and trimming headcounts to help protect their margins.”
Also, the US PMI for services fell to 50.8, a level indicating modest growth and the lowest reading since November 2023. S&P Global said that “business and consumer facing service providers alike, and especially financial services firms, are reporting markedly weaker growth prospects, citing intensifying uncertainty over the economic outlook amid recent tariff announcements and ongoing federal spending cuts.” It also said that service exports weakened considerably, likely due to the decline in inbound travel.
In neighboring Mexico, the manufacturing PMI continued to fall sharply, hitting 44.8 in April, the lowest level since February 2021, during the pandemic. This was largely due to “near-record” reduction in export orders, described as “plummeting,” caused primarily by trade uncertainty with the United States. This situation caused worsening sentiment, leading companies to reduce stocks, dismiss workers, and reduce input purchases. Also, Canada’s manufacturing PMI fell to 45.3, the lowest reading since May 2020. Output and new orders fell sharply in April. S&P said that “the uncertainty regarding the future direction and implementation of tariffs was again especially damaging, with markets characterized by hesitancy and delayed decision making.”
In Europe, the manufacturing PMI for the Eurozone continued to indicate contraction. However, the April PMI, at 49.0, was the best in 32-months. Moreover, output increased at the fastest pace in three years. Despite the improvement, S&P Global said that “industrial activity remains highly exposed to US tariff policy, but the planned sharp increase in defense spending in the EU could help stabilize the situation in the long term. This is confirmed by the survey’s optimism gauge.” Notably, output increased sharply in Germany and France.
In China, the April manufacturing PMI remained slightly above 50, indicating growth, but the pace of growth has slowed markedly. S&P commented that “the US tariff hikes took a toll on external demand, with new export orders declining at the fastest rate since July 2023, leading to just a marginal increase in total new orders in April. The impact of the tariffs on the supply side, however, was relatively limited.” In addition, they said that “business optimism weakened to one of its lowest levels on record.”
In Japan, the manufacturing PMI rose slightly but remained in negative territory. There was a steep decline in new orders and export orders. Consequently, “This prompted firms to cut back on their purchasing activity and readjust their inventories.”
Finally, in Southeast Asia, the PMI fell below 50.0 for the first time in 16 months and to the lowest level since August 2021. Output and new orders declined. The sub-index of confidence hit a 57-month low. The sharp decline in confidence “suggests that firms may be bracing for further challenges ahead.”
The Peterson Institute has calculated that it wouldn’t take long for a rising tariff rate to have a negative impact on government revenue. Specifically, it estimated that, if the United States imposes an across-the-board 10% tariff on all imports, the net 10-year boost to US government revenue would be US$1.575 trillion. Yet, if the United States imposes a 20% across-the-board tariff on all imports, the net gain in revenue over 10 years would only be US$791 billion—about half the revenue from a much smaller tariff. Both scenarios reasonably assume that other countries retaliate, thereby hurting US exports and weakening overall US economic activity. This demonstrates that there is a limit to how much revenue the US government can generate. Previous talk about replacing the income tax with tariffs has been floated by administration officials but remains challenging.
This analysis has important implications. If the US government sets tariff rates too high, it will not only hurt economic activity, but will also generate less revenue than a lower tariff rate. My view, however, is that the optimal tariff rate is zero. It has the least impact on prices and economic activity, encourages the greatest degree of efficiency by companies, and leads to the strongest economic performance, thereby generating plenty of tax revenue. If the government wants more revenue, it can raise taxes rather than simply tax imports which has a distorting impact on economic activity.
The US manufacturing sector’s value-added has been rising steadily for some time. From the first quarter of 2010 to the fourth quarter of 2024, manufacturing value-added increased 25%. However, the economy grew even faster, rendering manufacturing value-added as a lower share of GDP than previously. Still, since 2020, manufacturing value-added has remained a steady share of GDP at 9.9%. Meanwhile, since 2010, manufacturing employment has risen 11.5%.
The reason manufacturing employment rose more slowly than value-added is that industry labor productivity rose strongly, driven by investment in labor-saving and labor-augmenting technologies. For example, many manufacturers have invested in robotization. The result is that the skills mix of workers required by manufacturers has shifted, with fewer high school–educated assembly-line workers and more software engineers and other highly skilled workers.
As the mix of skills required by manufacturers has shifted, the availability of workers has become more problematic. The job openings rate for the manufacturing sector (the share of available jobs that are unfilled) is now close to the highest level ever if we exclude the period since the start of the pandemic. In other words, manufacturing in the US faces a labor shortage. And, at a time when immigration is declining, this shortage could become more acute.
And that raises the question as to whether it makes sense to shift production from overseas to the United States. If manufacturers shift production to the United States, they will require skilled workers that are already in short supply. If they bring more labor-intensive tasks to the United States, then prices will have to go much higher given the relatively high wages paid to US workers. And, if American consumers must pay much higher prices for manufactured goods, they will have less money available to pay for other goods and services, thereby potentially hurting employment in other industries.
Also, decisions to shift production from one country to another are major endeavors that cost a great deal of money and often take a long time to complete. These decisions are made based on expectations of what the economic environment is likely to be in the long term. If, for example, a company believes that a high tariff will remain in place indefinitely, then shifting production to the United States would likely make economic sense. Yet, if there is uncertainty about the duration of tariffs, such decisions could be risky. What if the administration that follows the current one takes an entirely different approach to tariffs? Then a long-term investment decision might turn out to be a poor bet. This uncertainty might potentially have a dampening effect on investment.
It is likely that these trends reflect businesses taking a wait and see approach, especially as the US administration has said that the 145% tariff on imports from China will come down. It is worth recalling that statements about reducing the tariff began immediately after the CEOs of three large US retailers met with President Trump, warning that empty shelves were coming. Yet will shipments continue to be cancelled if the United States and China fail to reach an agreement? Or will shipments resume, but with goods sold at much higher prices than previously? The answer is likely a bit of both. If tariffs remain in place for a while, businesses will ship a lower volume of goods and sell them at high prices. The decline in volume will be due to lesser demand for higher-priced products.
On the other hand, the number of ships arriving at the Port of Los Angeles last week was up 56% from a year earlier. This likely reflects front-loading of shipments, mainly by exporters from Southeast Asia who are enjoying the 90-day pause in reciprocal tariffs. Inventories of goods from Southeast Asia will accumulate, or consumers will purchase them in anticipation of potentially higher tariffs. We already saw a surge in total US retail sales in March due to anticipation of tariffs.
Meanwhile, the core parts of GDP did reasonably well. Consumer spending and business investment were up at healthy rates, suggesting that, in the first quarter, underlying economic performance was good. The first quarter ended just a few days before the announcement of massive tariffs on April 2.
However, even the underlying trends were affected by expectations of tariffs. For example, nonresidential fixed investment was up at stunning rate of 9.8%. This was almost entirely due to investment in equipment rising at a rate of 22.5%. That was probably a case of businesses rapidly purchasing equipment (computers, telecoms, transport equipment) in anticipation of tariffs. On the other hand, investment in structures (factories, warehouses, office buildings) increased at a paltry rate of 0.4%. That suggests that businesses started to put longer-term investment decisions on hold. Also, investment in intellectual property (software, research and development) increased at a strong rate of 4.1%. The threat of tariffs and uncertainty about tariffs likely led globally exposed companies to postpone decisions about supply chain investment. In the coming quarters, this could show up as a weakening of overall business investment.
In addition, consumer spending increased at a modest but healthy rate of 1.8%, down from the strong growth of 4.0% in the fourth quarter of 2024. Spending on durable goods was down 3.4%, while spending on nondurables and services increased 2.7% and 2.4%, respectively. The decline in durables was entirely due to weaker spending on automobiles. Notably, the March retail sales numbers showed strong growth in spending at automotive dealers, but much of that increase might have been due to price increases rather than volume gains. The strength of nondurables was largely due to increased spending on apparel, probably in anticipation of tariffs. As such, much of the GDP report was influenced by tariff uncertainty, even though President Trump said the decline in real GDP had “nothing to do with tariffs” and attributed the decline to the former administration. In any event, this report makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions.
Going forward, we don’t know if the tariffs that were postponed for 90 days will be implemented or abandoned. We don’t know if, as the president suggested, the tariffs on China will come down substantially. And we don’t know what other trade actions might be taken by the United States or its trading partners. Thus, it is immensely hard to predict how the US economy will evolve in the coming months. Asset prices currently reflect an increased probability of a US economic downturn. US equity prices fell today, not only on news of negative GDP growth, but also news of weak earnings reports from key companies. Even without any change in the tariff regime, uncertainty prevails, which likely has a chilling effect on many business and consumer decisions. Thus, it appears likely that, at the least, US economic growth will be much slower in the coming quarters than in the past year. One caveat is that, when imports revert to normal next quarter, GDP growth could temporarily accelerate.
In any event, the US government issues a monthly employment report that includes data from two surveys: a survey of establishments and a survey of households. The data from both surveys was better than anticipated. First, let’s look at the establishment survey: It found that 177,000 new jobs were created in April, slightly lower than the downwardly revised 185,000 created in March.
The manufacturing sector saw no growth in employment, with most of the growth coming from services. There was no growth in retailing, but there was strong growth in transportation and warehousing. There was only modest growth in financial services as well as professional and business services. Rather, there continued to be strong growth in health care and social assistance. There was modest growth in leisure and hospitality and almost no growth in government. Regarding the latter, there was modest growth for state and local governments, partly offset by a modest decline in federal government employment. Overall, job growth was extremely modest except for health care and transportation.
In addition, the establishment survey reported hourly earnings of workers on average, which were up 3.8% from a year earlier, the same as in March, which was the lowest since last July. Thus, wage pressure appears to have abated, possibly a sign that the previous tightness of the labor market is easing.
The separate survey of households, which includes data on self-employment, found that the labor force grew far more rapidly than the working-age population, thus boosting the participation rate. At the same time, employment grew almost as rapidly as the labor force, rendering the unemployment rate unchanged from March to April at 4.2%. Also notable was the fact that the number of discouraged workers fell from March to April, after having increased in the previous two months. In addition, U-6—a measure of the unemployment rate that takes account of workers marginally attached to the labor force as well as those forced to work part time—fell from 7.9% in March to 7.8% in April.
In response to today’s jobs report, US equity prices rose, hitting the level last seen just prior to the US announcement of tariffs on April 2—also known as Liberation Day. Investors were evidently pleased by the jobs report. Plus, it is reported that some investors believe the worst of the trade war is behind us. The yield on the US Treasury’s 10-year bond increased on the view that a healthier-than-expected economy boosts the likelihood of a tighter monetary policy. The US dollar fell moderately. The yen rose due to heightened expectations of a US-China trade deal, thereby reducing the impetus to see the yen as a safe haven. The euro rose on news of higher-than-expected inflation in the eurozone.
How is the US economy doing, given the policy changes that have taken place? We will learn how the US economy performed in the first quarter when the government releases the GDP report later this week. But there are other indicators that offer hints about the direction of activity. Here are a few:
In addition, it said that nonautomotive consumer spending fell while spending on automobiles increased sharply, “generally attributed to a rush to purchase ahead of tariff-related price increases.” The report also found that both personal and business travel was down, with a sharp drop in visits by foreigners. In sum, the report said that “the outlook in several districts worsened considerably as economic uncertainty, particularly surrounding tariffs, rose.”
Regarding labor markets, the Beige Book found that employment was either unchanged or up slightly in most districts. It found that hiring was slower for consumer-facing businesses than for business-to-business enterprises. However, “the most notable declines in head count were in government roles or roles at organizations receiving government funding.” Several districts reported “that firms were taking a wait-and-see approach to employment, pausing or slowing hiring until there is more clarity on economic conditions. In addition, there were scattered reports of firms preparing for layoffs.” The report found good labor availability, but also found some “constraints on labor supply resulting from shifting immigration policies in certain sectors and regions.”
Finally, the Beige Book found that prices were up either modestly or moderately in most districts. However, “most districts noted that firms expected elevated input cost growth resulting from tariffs. Many firms have already received notices from suppliers that costs would be increasing. Firms reported adding tariff surcharges or shortening pricing horizons to account for uncertain trade policy. Most businesses expected to pass through additional costs to customers.” On the other hand, there were reports about margin compression as demand “remained tepid.”
On balance, the latest Beige Book was focused on talk of tariffs and their impact. This is something I’ve never seen before. It demonstrates how the tariff situation is an important factor driving business decisions.
The April flash PMI for the United States found that the composite PMI (which covers all sectors) fell to its lowest level in 16 months. The subindex for sentiment about future output over the coming year fell to the lowest level since 2022. Interestingly, however, the sentiment subindex was much better for manufacturing than for services. Indeed, the overall PMI for services worsened while the PMI for manufacturing improved.
S&P Global commented that “the early flash PMI data for April point to a marked slowing of business activity growth at the start of the second quarter, accompanied by a slump in optimism about the outlook.” It added that “output rose in April at its slowest pace since December 2023, indicating that the US economy is growing at a modest annualized rate of just 1.0%.” Finally, it concluded that “manufacturing is broadly stagnating as any beneficial effect of tariffs are offset by heightened economic uncertainty, supply chain concerns, and falling exports, while the services economy is slowing amid weakened demand growth, notably in terms of exports such as travel and tourism.” The weakness of tourism may be related to more intense restrictions on foreign travelers coming to the United States.
Meanwhile, the subindices for prices accelerated in April. S&P Global reports that prices of goods and services were up at the fastest pace in 13 months, with prices of manufactured goods up at the fastest pace in 29 months. The higher prices were largely attributed to tariffs and their impact on import prices. S&P Global said that “these higher prices will inevitably feed through to higher consumer inflation, potentially limiting the scope for the Federal Reserve to reduce interest rates at a time when a slowing economy looks in need of a boost.” Indeed, the Fed faces a challenging task, given that it has highlighted the inflationary as well as stagnating impact of tariffs.
The sentiment index is based on two subindices, one concerning current conditions and the other concerning expected future conditions. The latter subindex on expected conditions fell to 47.3 in April, down 10.1% from March and down 37.8% from a year earlier. However, it is worth recalling that indices of consumer sentiment are not always good predictors of consumer behavior. Still, sharp movements in such indices are notable and offer insight into what might happen.
Also, expectations for inflation in the next 12 months increased from 5% in March to 6.5% in April. It was only 2.7% in October 2024, which means it has increased very rapidly. Expected 12-month inflation is now the highest since October 1981. The sharp increase is primarily due to the expectation that tariffs will lead to a big increase in prices. Interestingly, the separate breakeven rate, which measures bond investor expectations of inflation, has lately declined. This reflects increased expectations of a US recession and its impact on inflationary pressure.
The IMF periodically releases a forecast of economic growth and other indicators for most of the world’s countries. They convey useful guidance about the potential impact of changes in economic policies and other structural shifts in the global economy. In the latest outlook, the IMF notes that recent events have led to changes in the outlook. Specifically, the IMF said that the actions of the United States and other governments have brought “effective tariff rates to levels not seen in a century. This, on its own, is a major negative shock to growth. The unpredictability with which these measures have been unfolding also has a negative impact on economic activity and the outlook and, at the same time, makes it more difficult than usual to make assumptions that would constitute a basis for an internally consistent and timely set of projections.” The forecasts must be made based on assumptions that could quickly change.
In any event, the IMF has downwardly revised its expectations for global economic growth as well as for growth in almost every major country. It now expects that the global economy will grow 2.8% this year, down from 3.3% in its January forecast. Most notably, it revised its forecast for US economic growth from 2.7% in January to 1.8% now. For the eurozone, however, the revision was more modest, going from 1% in January to 0.8% now (with a growth forecast of 0% for Germany). There were more sizable revisions for the United Kingdom and Japan (growth downwardly revised by 0.5 percentage points), and Canada and China (downwardly revised by 0.6 percentage points). The 2025 growth forecasts are now 1.1% for the United Kingdom, 0.6% for Japan, 1.4% for Canada, and 4% for China. The latter figure is much lower than in recent years.
Regarding the United States, the IMF said that “the downward revision is a result of greater policy uncertainty, trade tensions, and a softer demand outlook, given slower-than-anticipated consumption growth.” In addition, the IMF model expects a sharp decline in US exports, mainly because it expects a sharp appreciation of the dollar against other currencies. That would be the normal pattern. However, the dollar has lately fallen sharply as global investors have increasingly sought safety in other countries. For China, the sharp downward revision of GDP growth reflects the impact of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs, both of which are expected to more than offset the positive impact of a more expansive fiscal policy.
Meanwhile, President Trump concurred and said that tariffs “will come down substantially.” There are reports that the US administration is considering unilaterally reducing the tariffs on China. One report said that White House officials are thinking about cutting the tariff on Chinese imports to between 50% and 60% from the current 145%. It was also reported that they are considering a tiered approach to tariffs, with high tariffs on goods deemed important to national security and low tariffs on other goods.
China’s government said that the United States should “completely cancel all unilateral tariff measures” if it expects China to negotiate. A Chinese official said that “there have been no consultations or negotiations between China and the United States regarding tariffs, let alone reaching an agreement.”
In response to China, US Treasury Secretary Bessent said that there will be no unilateral moves by the United States. He said that “there would have to be a de-escalation by both sides.” Moreover, he said that “a breakdown between the two countries on trade does not suit anybody’s interest.”
Which country is in a better bargaining position? It could be China. After all, only about 15% of Chinese exports go to the United States. Yet many US companies rely heavily on intermediate products imported from China, some of which are not available anywhere else. Of particular importance are the rare earth minerals that China is withholding. China is the biggest exporter and the United States the biggest importer of rare earths. In addition, medical-device manufacturers have warned that, because of the trade war with China, there could be substantial price increases as well as shortages for critically important medical equipment. Meanwhile, it has been reported that Chinese factories are slowing production and furloughing some workers, due to the US tariffs and an expected sharp decline in exports to the United States.
Although the United States and China both maintain exceptionally high tariffs on one another’s imports, the United States has now chosen to exempt automotive parts from the 145% tariff. This is being done to help US automotive companies to maintain competitiveness. However, a 25% tariff on auto parts will remain and is due to take effect in early May. The 25% tariff on imported automobiles will also remain. It is useful to recall that, when President Trump imposed tariffs on China in 2018, the US administration ultimately allowed thousands of very specific exemptions. This may happen again.
It is reported that China is exempting aerospace parts from US tariffs. While China has stopped taking deliveries of US-made jets, it continues to aspire to build a globally competitive aerospace industry and, consequently, needs key parts. Therefore, the exemption makes sense for China and is not necessarily a sign of easing tensions. On the other hand, it signals that China does not want to allow its retaliatory tariffs to hurt its ability to develop key industries.
Meanwhile, it is also reported that China has either exempted or is considering exempting other products from US tariffs. For example, there are reports that some semiconductors have been exempted. In addition, there are reports that China is considering exempting drugs and medical devices. Yet most goods imported to China from the United States remain subject to a 125% tariff. This has been especially challenging for the agriculture and energy industries in the United States.